![]() These educational contexts are defined in disciplinary, social, and cultural terms. Although general consensus among academics has resulted in a widely accepted definition of critical thinking since the 1990s, this paper suggests that critical thinking needs to be adapted to the specific needs of students in different educational contexts through the personal and working definitions of individual educators. Whereas critical thinking is often conflated with logic in Japanese discourse, this review shows that, outside of Japan, definitions of critical thinking have progressively moved away from logic to focus on a core of teachable skills. With the impact of increasing global competition, calls for greater emphasis on critical thinking in secondary and higher education are frequently heard in Japan, yet there is a lack of agreement on what is meant by the term “critical thinking.” This paper provides a review of selected literature, charting the chronological development of definitions of critical thinking in education during the twentieth century, and reflections on the application of critical thinking to different contexts. It is then argued that the principle of sufficient reason and that of the excluded antinomy points at a more than logical foundation for critical thinking and ultimately calls for a non-reductionist ontology. When a school of thought does not accept all the logical principles, the criteria for scientific thinking are challenged, for example in intuitionistic logic which rejects the universal validity of the principle of the excluded middle. It also questions the idea of autonomy and examines the switch from principles to values. ![]() An analysis of these principles requires an understanding of the uniqueness of, and coherence between, the logical and non-logical aspects in the light of contraries like logical-illogical, polite-impolite and frugal-wasteful. They connect critical thinking to the conceptual element of rationality and to the normed nature of logical thinking, manifest in logically sound (norm-conformative) thinking and antinormative thinking-briefly also accounting for the dialectical tradition. This task concerns first of all the well-known logical principles of identity, contradiction and the excluded middle. We conclude by offering some reflections on dangers to be avoided in defining 'critical thinking'.īefore criticism is justified, an account of the applicable criteria should be given. We attempt to remedy this defect by " resurrecting " it: we will present a typology of definitions, and propose, for certain types, the criteria for a successful definition of that type. For the inquiry to which one might turn for some guidance-what used to be called the logic of definition-has lain fallow for many years. Here we come up against an unacknowledged dimension of the problem. ![]() Then it must be shown that the proposed definition satisfies the criteria for a good definition of that sort. ![]() Next the proposer must provide the definition. To present a definition of the sort we envisage, the proposer must first of all identify the type of definition that it is being offered. By this, we mean something predicated on the view that the problem of defining 'critical thinking' is a second-order problem that has improperly been treated as if it were a straightforward first-order problem. We argue that a meta-level approach is called for. A new approach to the problem of defining 'critical thinking' is needed. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |